Choke Point Là Gì

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Countries are turning economic infrastructure inkhổng lồ political weapons, & that poses a major risk to business.Quý Khách sẽ xem: Choke point là gì
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Summary.Quý khách hàng sẽ xem: Choke point là gì

To conduct international commerce, businesses have sầu built an intricate system of networks that move money, information, và components around the world. These networks may look decentralized, but all too frequently, they have sầu major choke points. The majority of global finance transactions, for instance, are relayed through a single organization in Belgium. Many global tech firms depkết thúc heavily on the chips Qualcomilimet makes for Android devices. A huge proportion of global communications are routed through private servers on U.S. soil.

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Increasingly, these choke points are being turned inkhổng lồ political weapons by governments, and companies are getting caught in the cross fire. The stakes are high: Firms can go out of business if they’re cut off from critical networks. They need lớn analyze their exposure & develop a strategy to protect themselves.

Countries are turning economic infrastructure inkhổng lồ political weapons, & that poses a major risk khổng lồ business.

"> Idea in Brief The Vulnerability

To keep the global economy working smoothly, crucial resources such as money, information, and components pass through an intricate system of conduits. But while this critical invisible infrastructure may seem lớn be decentralized và have sầu multiple redundancies, it has significant choke points.

The New Risk

A new political risk comes from powerful, wealthy states—especially the United States—that use legal authority or coercion lớn turn economic networks into lớn tools of domination, ensnaring businesses in the process.

The Response

Multinational businesses should analyze their exposure to lớn network choke points. Lobbying government officials & teaming up with industry peers khổng lồ resist coercion can mitigate the risks.

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Since the kết thúc of the Cold War, businesses have sầu built an awe-inspiring global infrastructure. Digital pipelines move vast amounts of capital và data around the world, và supply chains crisscross international boundaries in a spider website of commerce. An intricate system of networks keeps the global economy running smoothly, but it’s easy khổng lồ take for granted, because it remains largely hidden from view.

Though these networks appear khổng lồ have sầu multiple redundancies and to be decentralized, many have significant choke points. Global finance relies on a single organization in Belgium to relay the majority of transactions between banks. Cloud computing’s information storage facilities are often located in the United States. Complex supply chains can be dependent on a handful of components, lượt thích the chips Qualcomilimet makes for devices with the Android operating system.

These choke points allow seemingly neutral infrastructure lớn be manipulated by governments khổng lồ further their national strategic goals. China’s push into 5G equipment has raised concerns in the West precisely because it might give sầu the Chinese access to lớn key parts of emerging communications networks. Japan recently restricted the export to South Korea of three chemicals crucial to lớn the production of semiconductors, because of a political spat with Seoul. And the United States has aggressively exploited its control of a variety of seemingly technical structures that make global trade possible; it now appears increasingly willing to lớn turn those structures inkhổng lồ a machinery of domination.

This new reality was summed up by former NSA director Michael Hayden in describing why the U.S. government coerced tech companies to lớn help its surveillance efforts by sharing confidential information routed through private servers on U.S. soil: “This is a home game for us….Why would we not turn the most powerful telecommunications and computing management structure on the planet lớn our use?”

Today the political risk businesses face doesn’t come just from developing countries that might abruptly change market rules or nationalize assets. It comes from powerful, wealthy states that are turning economic networks into political weapons. The stakes are high. Companies that are isolated from critical networks can go out of business. A global bank blocked by the United States from accessing a secure interbank communication system because it provides financial services to an American adversary is not going lớn be a global ngân hàng for long. A technology manufacturer that can’t buy sophisticated chips is in big trouble. Businesses that control digital hubs và are pressed into lớn service by states can suffer reputational damage. U.S. tech giants lượt thích Google và Facebook, for example, took a hit in foreign markets after Edward Snowden revealed that they had cooperated with U.S. surveillance activities.

What can global firms do lớn protect themselves? The key is khổng lồ underst& the specifics of the networks your organization depends on và then create a strategy to address the possibility that they will become weaponized. But lớn start with, executives need to accept that the world—& specifically, America’s role in it—has changed.

America’s New Role

As political scientists, we’ve been studying the United States’ use of economic networks to lớn achieve its national objectives for cthất bại khổng lồ two decades, and we feel that the corporate world consistently underestimates the risks from this size of political muscle flexing. In large part that’s because the country has long been a proponent và guarantor of global business, so it’s hard khổng lồ conceive of it as a potential threat. It’s equally hard to imagine that the networks that have been the driving force of globalization could be used lớn chain and entangle companies. But we believe sầu that the “America first” approach, which treats international business infrastructure as a political tool, is profoundly reshaping the world economy.

cảnh báo that this isn’t a new strategy for the United States; Hayden’s remarks were made in 2013. Indeed, the George W. Bush và Obama administrations both used U.S. Treasury controls & the dollar-clearing system—which converts foreign currencies into lớn dollars, the lingua franca of international trade—lớn try lớn prevent financial institutions from providing services to Iran và North Korea. America’s intelligence services pressed U.S.-based internet-communications firms not only lớn provide data on suspected terrorists but also khổng lồ help spy on U.S. adversaries, rivals, and even partners.

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During the presidential chiến dịch, Trump railed against the agreement with Iran. Despite desperate attempts by European politicians to lớn save sầu it, the United States withdrew from it in 2018 và then unilaterally reinstated sanctions that made it illegal to buy Iranian oil. Any banks—including foreign banks—that facilitate such transactions could face U.S. fines. BNP Paribas & others had already paid billions of dollars in penalties for violating the previous round of sanctions. Citing the risk that new fines associated with Iranian trades could destabilize the financial system, SWIFT felt it had no choice but lớn cut off Iranian banks’ access in 2018. This time the Europeans were apoplectic. French finance minister Bruno Le Maire said that European countries should not accept the United States as the “economic policeman of the planet” and allow themselves lớn become its “vassals.”

The Trump administration has also exploited its de facto lớn control of the flow of crucial tech components lớn target both Đài Loan Trung Quốc và rogue states like Iran & North Korea. From 2010 khổng lồ năm 2016 the Chinese telecommunications manufacturer ZTE sold restricted technologies khổng lồ Iran và North Korea, violating U.S. export controls. It was forced to lớn agree lớn an expensive settlement with U.S. authorities. When ZTE flouted that settlement, the U.S. government banned American firms from supplying ZTE with parts, including the Qualcomilimet chips it needs. This might have sầu driven ZTE out of business if President Trump had not swapped a lighter penalty for concessions in his trade fight with Trung Quốc.

More recently, the U.S. government blacklisted the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. Corporate America had expected the United States to ban Huawei from selling to domestic markets. Many in the business community, however, didn’t anticipate the decision lớn restrict the export of U.S. công nghệ khổng lồ Huawei, putting the firm’s very existence in danger & injecting uncertainty into global supply chains. Huawei estimated that more than 1,200 U.S. firms would thua kém contracts with it. Google has warned that it will not provide Android to lớn new Huawei phones, & Microsoft temporarily stopped selling Huawei laptops in its online store. This has led China lớn threaten to constrain its sales of essential rare-earth metals khổng lồ U.S. giải pháp công nghệ companies và to lớn start building its own blackdanh mục of foreign firms. FedEx is at risk of being put on that danh mục, because the Chinese government claims that the company knowingly rerouted Huawei packages destined for Trung Quốc from other countries in Asia lớn the United States. U.S. manufacturers are frantically checking their supply chains to lớn identify Chinese partners that might be subject to the new economic tensions, while financial firms are asking whether they want to lớn orient themselves toward the United States or Đài Loan Trung Quốc. Everyone fears the worst is yet to lớn come, because Trump has “ordered” U.S. companies to immediately find alternatives lớn Chinese suppliers, and other U.S. policy makers are asking whether America needs lớn “decouple” its economy from China’s. In October 2019 the U.S. government blacklisted an additional 28 Chinese firms for their role in human rights violations against Musllặng minorities in China. As of this writing, the U.S. Justice Department was trying to block the completion of a $300 million submarine cable that would connect Hong Kong & Los Angeles—and had already mostly been laid by Google, Facebook, and Dr. Peng Telecom và Media Group, a Chinese company—on the grounds of national security.

A New Game

As other powerful states respond khổng lồ và even model the U.S. strategy, a war is quietly being waged through manufacturing ties và business relationships. U.S. officials are concerned that Chinese-produced components could be compromised và then deployed in surveillance activities or even sabotage. Chinese leaders fear that the United States will use the ZTE playbook against more Chinese firms. They worry that America sees Chinese economic strength as a security threat and will bởi everything it can lớn hamper & even cripple the Chinese economy. This is one reason they’re trying lớn accelerate their ability lớn develop & manufacture advanced chips: so that they won’t be at the mercy of the U.S. government.

Although the European Union has officially identified Đài Loan Trung Quốc as a rival & begun lớn pay much closer attention lớn Chinese acquisitions, it is still far less belligerent toward China than the United States is. Indeed, it’s beginning to create ways to work around U.S. economic power & perhaps even oppose it. For instance, Europeans have started khổng lồ experiment with alternative financial channels that are less exposed to lớn U.S. pressure. In 2019 the governments of France, Germany, & the United Kingdom jointly created an international barter system, known as Instex, which offers an alternative payment method that circumvents U.S. sanctions on Iran. Instex has had teething problems, and trade between Iran & Europe is negligible, but Europe’s experiment may give sầu it the tools to lớn counteract future U.S. sanctions against much more economically important countries, lượt thích Russia.

Disputes can quickly escalate. When Japan pushed baông xã against South Korean claims for World War II reparations by blocking the export lớn Korea of key chemicals needed by the semiconductor & manufacturing industries, it sent chills through the boardrooms at Samsung & LG. South Korea, in turn, has threatened to retaliate by cutting off supplies of heating oil lớn nhật bản. Businesses are being forced into lớn involuntary service in purely political disputes.

Understanding Your Exposure

The firms located at choke points are the most directly at risk. Google’s Android operating system, Visa’s payment channel, FedEx’s courier và logistics services, và Qualcomm’s chips are all hugely profitable because they sit at the center of vast global networks everyone wants access lớn. Their market control has always been a gold mine. It’s now also a political vulnerability, creating dependencies that powerful governments may want khổng lồ exploit for national security purposes.

Companies that lie at emerging choke points are likely to lớn also come under pressure. Behind the U.S. case against Huawei is a straightforward fear: that America will đại bại control over 5G networks và the internet of things. U.S. security would be threatened in a world where everyone depends on Chinese communications technology. Building a choke point, knowingly or not, puts you in the crosshairs.

When governments target choke-point companies, other businesses can get caught in the crossfire. The U.S. ban on Huawei reverberated throughout the firm’s supply chain. The U.S. chipmaker Skyworks, which got 12% of its sales from Huawei, was blindsided; its stoông xã fell sharply & took weeks khổng lồ recover. Upstream, political uncertainty is leading all telecommunications firms to delay 5G investments. The CEO of Sweden’s Tele2, Anders Nilsson, put it bluntly: “Decisions are postponed. This is not only Huawei; this is all vendors.”

As Đài Loan Trung Quốc retaliates, the economic fallout is likely to spread. Cisco’s CEO, Chuck Robbins, says the anti-American backlash in Trung Quốc is hurting his company: “We’re being uninvited khổng lồ bid. We are not even being allowed to participate anymore.” Tertiary companies that are neither choke-point providers nor directly up- or downstream will also be affected. A slowdown in 5G’s rollout will reshape entire markets for điện thoại equipment, audiovisual offerings, và smart, connected products.

Can’t diversification help companies avoid this new size of risk? Firms don’t lượt thích relying on a single supplier anyway, since that supplier might raise prices, defect to lớn competitors, or go bust. But diversification won’t mitigate political risk if all the suppliers of, say, a critical component are in the same country or dependent on the same choke point. Instead, executives should think about developing alternative sầu network hubs or in-house or in-country capabilities that allow them lớn minimize vulnerabilities. After the ZTE incident, Huawei saw that it was at risk & stockpiled its U.S.-made components. Increased redundancy may also reduce vulnerability.

Doing an analysis of the risk your specific sector faces is helpful too. The Trump administration (&, ultimately, its successors) will probably weaponize a host of networks, but some sectors are more exposed than others are. In recent disputes with Trung Quốc, the United States has focused on technologies like telecommunications, drones, and surveillance systems, all of which are viewed as having both commercial and military applications. But less-obvious sectors are increasingly vulnerable. It is unlikely that Beijing Kunlun Tech expected the United States khổng lồ request that it divest Grindr, a gay dating network, but if it had thought about how personal information could be used for blackmail, it might have foreseen the possibility. Companies that did not think of their sectors as politically risky—perhaps because they were producing relatively innocuous products such as camera-enabled doorbells—should have sầu paid attention when U.S. defense legislation targeted Hikvision and its surveillance giải pháp công nghệ in early 2018. The U.S. intelligence community has also been issuing warnings about Huawei for several years. Executives dismiss these “weak signals” at their own peril.

Mitigating the Risk

Identifying risks is only the first step. As the global economy moves away from open trade, companies need new strategies and relationships that balance economic efficiency with security. Firms essentially have three choices: collaborate, resist, or educate.

After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the U.S. government sought private sector help. A group of firms running network choke points, most notably FedEx, volunteered to work with it. FedEx CEO Fred Smith argued at the time, “All we are trying lớn vị is to lớn protect our assets & not have sầu our assets be used for bad purposes.” This approach can have sầu great benefits, but it may pose problems in a world where cooperating with one government may provoke another government lớn target you. HSBC, for instance, complied with U.S. authorities’ demand for financial information on Huawei, and now it is at risk of being blacklisted by the Chinese government.

Once it was the places that globalization hadn’t yet reached that were politically dangerous. Now new political risks are found right at the heart of the global economy. They’re coming from the very infrastructure that facilitates global business, which powerful states are weaponizing. Executives who fail to underst& this new world are likely lớn run into serious trouble.